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of the State of Utah 
W. R. YOUNG, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondent 
vs. 
JOE DOE FELORNIA, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants 
W. R. YOUNG, et al., 
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Case No. 7772 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing 
Statement of Points Relied Upon 
POINT NO.1 
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY NEW 
QUESTIONS IN THEIR PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
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POINT NO. II 
THE STATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THIS 
ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO.1 
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY NEW 
QUESTIONS IN THEIR PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
In the petition for rehearing and supporting brief, appel-
lants set out nine points which they argue and allege justify a 
rehearing of this case. It is abundantly clear from prior briefs 
submitted to this Court by the appellants, however, that each 
of the arguments and points raised have been previously 
submitted to the Court and were considered by this Court at 
the time of the decision and opinion heretofore rendered. 
Specifically, the argument and point raised as No. 1 in 
the petition and supporting brief for rehearing was argued as 
Point No. 2 in appellants' Reply Brief. Point No. 2 of the 
Brief in Support of the Application for Rehearing was argued 
as Point No. 1 in appellants' Reply Brief. Appellants' Point 
No. 3 relative to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 was specifical-
ly argued in Point No. 3t of their original brief. Point No. 4 
with reference to the Enabling Act of the State of Utah was 
specifically argued to the Court in Point No. 4 of appellants' 
original brief. Point No. 5 with respect to defendants' and 
appellants' desire to prove their claimed aboriginal rights was 
argued in Point 2 of their original brief, and in Point 3 of 
their Reply Brief. Points Nos. 6 and 7 are included in the 
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entire argument made by appellants in their original and reply 
briefs, and there is nothing new suggested or added in ap-
pellants' Brief in Support of Rehearing that was not argued 
in the original hearing of this cause. 
Appellants' Point No. 8 is not argued in any way in the 
Brief on petition for Rehearing, but rather appellants state 
that it is self-asserting. It has been argued heretofore in Points 
Nos. 2 and 6 of the original brief. Moreover, it is clear that 
the trial court and the Supreme Court did not disregard the 
allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, wherein it is alleged that 
the defendants are residents and citizens of San Juan County, 
State of Utah. There is nothing inconsistent in such an allega-
tion and that the defendants are bound as "treaty Indians." 
Appellants do not cite any authority in support of such a 
suggestion, and it is submitted that it is not the law. Point 
No. 9 is nothing more than a general ·summary of all the 
arguments made by the appellants in their original brief 
and their Reply Brief in this case. 
Since no new arguments are made by appellants and no 
new points raised, and particularly inasmuch as the opinion 
of this Court treats all of the questions raised by the petition 
for rehearing, there is no reason for further consideration of 
the matter by this Court. The petition should be denied. 
POINT NO. II 
THE STATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THIS 
ACTION. 
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On Pages 5 and 6 of their brief, appellants apparently 
take the position that the State Court did not have juris-
diction to determine the controversy between the parties in-
volved in this lawsuit because the defendants were Indians. 
It is clear from a reading of the cases cited by appellants that 
none of them are in point in this case. Inasmuch as these 
particular cases were not cited in appellants' prior briefs, they 
are treated briefly here. 
In Caesar v. Krow (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1918), 176 Pac. 927, 
it was held that the state court did not have jurisdiction in an 
action to recover the possession of two allotments under the 
General Allotment Act, approved February 8, 1887 (24 Stat. 
at L. C. 119), as amended by the Acts of February 28, 1891 
(25 Stat. at L. 794, C. 383) and March 3, 1893 (27 Stat. at 
L. 644, C. 209). In that statute, Congress specifically conferred 
authority upon the Secretary of the Interior to ascertain heir-
ship of Indians to whom an allotment had been made. Of 
course, that case is not in point for two reasons. In the first 
place it is under a specific Act of Congress conferring exclu-
sive jurisdiction for determination of the question in dispute 
upon the Secretary of the Interior; secondly, the controversy 
concerns an Indian allotm~nt under a specific Act of Congress. 
In the case at bar, appellants were given and expressly 
declined the opportunity to prove any right to allotments as 
individuals. Instead they stated to the Court, through their 
counsel, that their claim was to the aboriginal possessory 
rights as a band and not as individuals. This is clear from the 
following colloquy between Court and Counsel at the pre-
trial (R. 87) : 
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"THE COURT: For the purpose of this pretrial, 
you indicated to the Court, Mr. Patterson, that these 
defendants do not claim any inclosed, cultivated pieces 
of ground within this area. 
MR. PATTERSON: True that some of these Indians 
have little garden spots which are fenced off with 
brush and willows and the like, but I think that your 
statement is right, generally, that is not what we are 
suing for. We are suing for the right to live there 
of course, but we are suing for range land. 
THE COURT: You are not asking the Court to set 
apart any particular· land to the Indians? 
MR. PATTERSON: That is right. 
THE COURT: You are claiming that these defend-
ants have a right to this land as a Clan or a Tribe, 
separate and distinct, from those that are on the res-
ervation as a band? 
MR. PATTERSON: Yes * * * ." 
The defendants moreover expressly disclaimed any right 
to possession of the lands in question through any Act of 
Congress. This appears at Page 97 of the record, where various 
stipulations were being made between counsel: 
"MR. BURTON: And that any rights or claims be-
ing asserted by defendants have not been recognized 
by any act of Congress? 
MR. PATTERSON: Yes." 
An allomtent theory, of course, would be based upon a 
Congressional Act authorizing or creating the allotment. De-
fendants made no such claim either at the pretrial or in any 
pleading filed in this action. 
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In United States v. Kagema, et al. (1885), 118 U.S. 375, 
30 L. Ed. 228, the question presented was whether the United 
States had jurisdiction of a murder committed upon an Indian 
reservation situated wholly within the State of California. The 
Court held that as long as the Indian maintained the tribal 
relationship on the reservation, no allegiance was owed to a 
state, and the state gave the Indian no protection. A crime 
committed upon the reservation was subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States. Of course, this principle of 
law is uncontroverted and it is not involved in any manner or 
respect in the case at bar. None of the Indians involved here 
are on a reservation, nor are the acts of trespass complained 
of upon a reservation. In fact, the controversy here arose 
because of defendants' failure to stay on the reservation. 
McKay v. Kalyton (1906), 204 U.S. 458, 51 L. Ed. 566, 
cited by appellants at Page7, involves a controversy with 
respect to the right to possession of an Indian allotment while 
it was held in trust by the United States under the provision 
of the Act of August 15, 1894 (24 Stat. at L. 286, C. 290), 
which vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Court of 
questions concerning allotments under the Act. Of course, 
the Court held that the State Court had no jurisdiction of such 
a controversy, but, as heretofore pointed out, the right to the 
possession of anallotment is not involved in this proceeding. 
Minnesota v. Hitchcock ( 1901), 185 U. S. 3 72, 46 L. Ed. 
954, cited by appellants at Page 7, involved the right of the 
State of Minnesota to bring an action originally in the United 
States Supreme Court. The case involved lands known as the 
"Red Lake Indian Reservation." The Court held that the land 
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was in fact an Indian Reservation, and the State of Minnesota 
received no interest therein. 
In the cases of Patalla v. United States (Cir. Ct. Dist. of 
Ore., 1904), 132 F. 893, and Parr z1. United States (Cir. Ct. 
Dist. of Ore., 1904), 132 F. 104, involve a right to lands subject 
to the Act of August 15, 1984 (28 Stat. 305), in which the 
Circut Court was given exclusive jurisdiction. The action in 
each case was by Indians to recover allotted lands. Of course, 
there can be no controversy that under these conditions the Cir-
cuit Court had exclusive original jurisdiction, but the difficulty 
with appellants' position in the case at bar with respect to these 
cases is that appellants do not make any claim by reason of 
allotments. They reject their right to stand on any allotment 
theory, and they do not have any standing in court by reason 
of allotment claims. The cases are certainly not in point for 
the proposition contended for by appellants in their brief. 
An Indian who is not physically upon an Indian Reserva-
tion is subject to the laws of the state or territory in which 
he finds himself to the same extent that a non-Indian citizen 
or alien would be subject to these laws. Hunt v. State, 4 Kan. 
60 ( 1866), murder of an Indian by another Indian; In re 
Woolf, 27 F. 606, 610 (D. C. W. D. Ark.), conspiracy by 
Indians to obtain money by false prentenses from an Indian 
nation in the District of Columbia; State v. Williams, 43 Pac. 
15 (Sup. Ct. of Wash., 1895), murder of Indian by Indian 
outside of an Indian reservation; Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 
134, 46 Pac. 636 ( 1896), murder of Indian by another Indian 
outside the reservation; State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 
55 Pac. 1026 ( 1899), murder of a white man by an Indian; 
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State v. Little Whirlwind, 22 Mont. 425, 56 Pac. 820 (1899), 
murder of a white man by an Indian; Ex Parte Moore, 28 S.D. 
339, 133 N. W. 817 ( 1911), murder of an Indian by another 
Indian on a public domain allotment, commented on in Anno-
tated Cases 1914B, 648, 652. 
Except with respect to questions involving tribal rela-
tions as such, or the Federal Government as such, an Indian 
has the same status to sue and be sued in state courts as any 
other citizen. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317, 332, 36 L. Ed. 
719, 726 (1892). In Ke-Tuc-e-Mun-Guah v. McClure, 122 
Ind. 541, 23 N. E. 1080 ( 1890), it was held that a suit could 
not be maintained against an Indian on a promissory note 
in a State Court. In Stacy v. LaBelle, 99 Wis. 520, 75 N. W. 
60 ( 1898), it was held that suit could be maintained against 
an Indian in a State Court on a contract. In Missouri-Pacific 
R. R. Co. v. Cullers, 81 Tex. 382, 17 S. W. 19 ( 1891), a cause 
of action was owned by an Indian against the railroad company 
and his rights were assigned. The assignee was held to have 
the right to maintain the action against the railroad company. 
In discussing the various incidents of Federal and State 
jurisdiction over Indians, Cohen summarizes the cases and 
the principles announced therein as follows (Cohen, Hand-
book of Federal Indian Law, P. 121): 
" ( 1) In matters involving only Indians on an Indian 
reservation, the State has no jurisdiction in the absence 
of specific legislation by Congress.· ( 2) In all other 
cases, the State has jurisdiction unless there is involved 
a subject matter of special Federal concern." 
At Page 9 of appellants' brief in support for their Peti-
10 
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tion for Rehearing, counsel urges-apparently as a final, last-
ditch argument-that the State Court does not have jurisdic-
tion because it allegedly could not enforce its decree. This was 
the basis for the refusal of the United States District Court 
in a similar case. United States v. Hosteen Tse-kesi, et al. 
(U. S. District Court Dist. of Utah, 1950), 93 Fed. Sup. 745. 
The Tenth Circuit Court expressly reversed the district judge 
on this point, however. The Court said: 
"While there may be cases where the court would be 
justified in refusing to exercise jurisdiction, ordinarily 
it is under a duty to decide cases upon their merits 
and may not arbirtraily refuse to exercise its juris-
diction when invoked by appropriate proceedings. As 
Chief Justice Marshall said in an early case, 'With 
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case 
may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought 
before us.' * * * 
"Injunctive relief for continued and repeated tres-
passes should not be denied because it is thought that 
such an injunction will not be obeyed and that it would 
be difficult to enforce. We think the court should as-
sume that its orders and decrees will be promptly 
obeyed by litigants rather than assuming they would 
be disobeyed. We find nothing in the record which 
would indicate that the defendants intended to defy 
an adverse ruling of the court. * * * 
"The fact that the court had no power to provide 
another place for the defendants to live, whereas the 
United States had such power, was not an adequate 
or legal ground for denying the relief. The defendants 
were charged with being wilful and continous tres-
passers upon the lands of the United States. If this 
charge was proved to the satisfaction of the Court 
an injunction should issue. Where the trespassers might 
11 
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reside after the injunction issues cannot be determined 
in this action." (191 Fed. (2d) 519, at 520). 
It does not appear to be unduly charitable to presume that 
the defendants in this case will obey the order of the District 
Court upon final determination of this litigation. In the 
event, however, that defendants fail to abide the decision in 
a lawful manner, the District Court has already made evident 
that it has the ingenuity and power to effectively cope with 
a violation of its decree. Certainly, as was stated by the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, it would be unwarranted under the cir-
cumstances of this case for a trial court having jurisdiction of 
the subject matter to refuse to exercise its powers because it 
was intimidated by defendants' counsel that defendants might 
not choose to abide by its decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants and appellants in this action admittedly 
make no claim to the land in question as though the land was 
a part of an Indian reservation (R. 97). Defendants have 
likewise expressly relinquished any claim to specific enclosed 
land on the theory that defendants have some allotments (R. 
87). It is therefore apparent that trespass of the land in ques-
tion, whether by Indians or by any other persons, is subject 
to the jurisdiction of the State Court. No question has been 
raised by the defendants as to the right of plaintiffs to main-
tain this action. Defendants concede that the plaintiffs have 
sufficient interest to maintain an action to enjoin repeated 
trespass. 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The parties being before the Court and the subject 
matter being within the power of the Court, it follows that 
the Court was not only within its power but it was exercising 
the duties of its office in rendering the decision in this case. The 
appellants have raised no new issues in asking for a rehearing, 
but on the contrary all of the issues discussed in their Petition 
and Brief were decided upon the record and arguments before 
this Court at the time of the decision of May 21, 1952. 
The suggestion made in the petition that the State Court 
does not have jurisdiction of the action is absolutely unsupport-
ed by the authorities and is contrary to law. The petition for 
rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN 
and RICHARDS, 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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